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RECENT BOOKS 
FAIR FIGHTS AND FouL: A DISSENTING LAWYER'S LIFE. By Thur-
man Arnold. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1965. Pp. xi, 
292. $5.95. 
Thurman Arnold brought a very bright mind to the most varied 
career in the history of American law. A Chicago lawyer, Wyoming 
legislator, Laramie lawyer, West Virginia dean, federal prosecutor, 
Yale professor, federal judge, and founder of one of the nation's lead-
ing law firms, he has accumulated an enviable breadth of experience. 
His recounting of it is bound to entertain any lawyer and most 
laymen. 
For profundity or novelty, the book is a bit disappointing. Arnold 
lacks the introspection or the immodesty to let us share his inside 
view of these experiences. If he has spared us the vulgar breast-beat-
ing that seems to characterize many lawyers' accounts of Cases They 
Have Won, he has not resisted the temptation to publish a work that 
might have been more accurately subtitled "A Lawyer's Favorite 
Briefs." Fair Fights and Foul is not any less readable on that account, 
however. 
Appraised as advocacy, the book must be accounted a success. 
Partly this is because he is a facile advocate; partly it is because, like 
Perry Mason, he is on the right side of almost every issue. He is for 
good government, fast trains, pure water, reapportionment, integra-
tion, fair trials, the Federal Rules, the Supreme Court, humane 
treatment of mental incompetents, and competition. He is against 
McCarthyism, legislative abuse, red tape, poverty, big trusts, doc-
trinaire ignorance, the forms of action, censorship, and McNaghten's 
Rule. It is perhaps his advocate's skill that leads him to fight always 
from high ground. 
He is not always shooting at fish in a barrel. This book purports 
to be in part an updating of his Folklore of Capitalism, and his 
economic views cannot be expected to seem unassailable to all. His 
prescriptions of a bit of economic planning, loose money, and 
budget un-balancing do not exactly express "conventional wisdoms." 
On the other hand, his affirmative proposals are never too precise; 
the conservative counterattack must locate a moving target. Arnold's 
purpose seems to be less to make new suggestions than to remark on 
the rising acceptance of some of his earlier views--to gloat, in other 
words, over recent election returns. 
For this reviewer, Arnold's style is marred by his persistence in 
ascribing religious fervor to all his foes. This is almost a fetish. 
Doubtless there is some truth in the observation that our views on 
social issues must ultimately rest on faith of some kind, and some 
popular nostrums have little else to sustain them; it is helpful em-
[562] 
Recent Books 563 
l 
phasis to dismiss them as primitive medicine for witch doctors. 
When the weapon is used as a blunderbuss in all directions, however, 
the recoil must be damaging to the marksman. So it is to Arnold. 
After garbing all his adversaries in the ghoulish masks and cloaks of 
medicine men, he is left as the only non-ghoul-the knightly cham-
pion of Reason. No one can play this role and get away with it. 
Arnold hasn't all the answers and, in the end, his views also must 
rest on faith of a sort. When this truth inevitably emerges from time 
to time, the reader is inspired to throw a rock or two at the iconoclast. 
This feature of his style is most discomfiting in Arnold's chapter 
on the law as a learned profession. His point is made with such 
ambivalence that it is a little hard to be sure what it is, but the 
thrust seems to be that intellectual effort is less necessary for lawyers 
than it seems; the English make out pretty well with nothing but 
careless, glib advocacy, and the more scholarly approach of American 
lawyers is important only as ceremony. By smothering our conten-
tions with footnotes and string citations, we nurse the illusion that 
we are distilling impartial principles of law to be applied by an 
impartial judiciary. 
This ideal can never be achieved. An objective psychologist 
would probably say that it has no scientific basis, that no 
amount of research and conferences can eliminate the instinc-
tive reactions that the environment and the training of a judge 
have created and that condition his reasoning. But such a psy-
chologist would be forgetting that a more important purpose of 
the judicial process, exceeding in social value what happens 
in an individual case, is the belief it induces in the public that 
there is and can be impartial justice. This ideal is celebrated by 
our law schools and by our tradition of legal scholarship. It is 
offended by oral decisions made immediately after oral argu-
ment. We can never attain to Britain's speedy administration of 
justice.1 
The appearance of learning is all that is required to preserve the 
illusion. There is an easy cynicism in this. Of course, the ideal de-
scribed can never be achieved, nor perhaps can any other in such an 
imperfect world. But the pursuit of it is important for a reason that 
Arnold's behavioral psychologist would probably reject, if it occurred 
to him: It may be, as the psychologist might urge, that men are con-
trolled by their environment and cannot control it; but their brutish 
lives are more interesting when they try. Our legal scholarship 
represents our collective effort to find means to control our collective 
destiny as a community. It is more than a heraldic ritual of impar-
tiality; for that, trials by ordeal would serve as well. Our efforts at 
a reasoned legal process are the sign, also, of our confidence that 
together we may yet control the beast; that, by ordered means, we 
1. P. 260. 
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can do what we intend. When we stop doing the hard thinking about 
legal problems, we will yield our collective hopes for a more sociable 
future. The legal profession, with its responsibility for learning, is 
the custodian of these hopes. Woe to him who slackens! 
It is possible to dismiss this view as so much ascetic Puritanism, 
and Arnold is tempted to do so. But he is ultimately true to his 
Presbyterian ancestors and embraces it. His career as scholar, judge, 
and advocate refutes his denial and demonstrates a concern for 
sound policy; he has eagerly joined in the process of forging it on 
the anvils of research, the sweat of earnest intellectual effort visible 
on his brow. This very book testifies to his belief that clear thinking 
has a future. If we scholars are not always lucid and. relevant, that 
is no reason for the young advocate to become a cavalier. Arnold did 
not. And if he does not always know what he is talking about or 
studying, that is no reproach. The ideal need not be attained; it is 
sufficiently important simply that we prolong the quest for the ideal 
so that others can hope, and perhaps join in the entertainment of 
the pursuit. 
In describing Arnold's own attitude toward the determinism he 
seems to preach, it seems fitting to use his own anecdote: 
When I was tw-elve I worked for one of my father's clients, 
Colonel E. J. Bell. He owned large ranches and put up over 
two thousand tons of hay. I proudly drove a rake. The Colonel 
had a hay crew of about fifty men, which made it expensive 
when the rain stopped all haying activity until the grass was 
dry. One Monday it started to rain. Tuesday it was still raining; 
Wednesday the same. But Thursday was bright and sunny and 
the hay dried and the mowers went into the field. Friday morn-
ing the rakes and the stacking crew were called out. But at 
noon on Friday it began to rain again. 
I remember the scene as if it were yesterday. I was unhitch-
ing my horses from the rake. The rest of the crew were doing 
the same. Suddenly there appeared from the direction of the 
ranch a tiny speck. As it grew larger we could see it was a man 
on horseback. Then we could see that it was Colonel Bell, 
riding toward us at a dead run. When he reached the haystack 
where we were unharnessing, he pulled his horse back on its 
haunches, drew his revolver and began to shout at God. "I see 
the bald-headed old S.O.B.," he shouted, "and I'll get him."2 
¾ 
It is not hard to imagine Arnold in Colonel Bell's stirrups. Fair 
Fights and Foul is, after all, a sort of skyward shaking of the fist. It 
is admirable just because such audacity is the secret ingredient of 
aspiration, if not of progress. 
2. Pp. 6-7. 
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